A surprising contact on LinkedIn. A proposal of work from a headhunter, probably a young woman, based in China. The opportunity to make perhaps £20,000 part-time writing a small number of political analyses for a Chinese company containing confidential or “insider” insights. Payment in digital currency or cash preferred.
It might appear clear, on this telling, that an element about this method would be suspicious. Nevertheless, Beijing's influential Ministry of State Security continues to view it valuable to deploy headhunters to attempt this – prompting the domestic spy agency to issue multiple warnings about their operations online.
Large-Scale Approaches on Professional Networks
Last year, MI5 chief Ken McCallum stated operatives from China were contacting Britons on LinkedIn on an unprecedented level, at a rate of ten thousand over the previous two and a half years, seeking political, commercial, military and scientific secrets. But a fresh campaign targeting politicians and Westminster has prompted the spy agency to take further action.
A spying warning was distributed on this week via the administrative teams of the Commons speaker and his Lords counterpart: a single slide after the repeated efforts of certain individuals and other operatives to reach out to MPs, lords, their assistants, economic experts, thinktanks – anybody who might provide information.
Intelligence Approach and Legal Updates
In the typical style of British intelligence, there was no publication of the security advice from the agency or the Home Office. But the agency knew its briefing note would leak once it was emailed out to parliament. Sharing it in the press assists the general population more easily recognize interactions with a deceptive intent.
This warning has the impact of uncovering more information from within parliament, although that is not the agency's main objective. The agency wants public figures to understand that simply because interactions on LinkedIn are not as toxic as on other social platforms, it does not mean they are without risk.
Nor is internal security service believed to have been reacting to any specific incident in the legislature, though the burst of activity does come after the embarrassing failure of the legal case of a ex-assistant an individual and his friend another person on a technicality in recent months.
The two had been accused of spying for the foreign power – a allegation they rejected – but failure to complete a trial under the now repealed Official Secrets Act resulted in concerns that British democracy had been insufficiently defended.
Revised Laws and Beijing's Long-Term Goals
The law has since been updated, and the security briefing includes a reminder of its replacement: “Those engaging in espionage activity risk substantial legal consequences under the National Security Act.” This constitutes a crime if somebody participates in conduct that is or is likely to “significantly help a overseas spy agency”.
An obvious question, though, is what Beijing has to gain. A politician who is outside ministerial roles will have restricted access of classified material, and an associate of theirs even less. But the Chinese government is also interested in the legislative body: for a time, in 2020 and 2021, the Britain's approach to China on issues such as Huawei or the human rights situation or genocide was being driven by MPs.
Cultural Variations and Persistent Digital Threats
To a degree there are distinct approaches too. Autocratic regimes like Beijing's export intelligence collection techniques and the size of its spy network is enormous, employing three hundred thousand people. Chris Inglis, a American cybersecurity head under president Joe Biden, commented it was sometimes estimated that “the Chinese have greater linguistic capacity involved in this than Western agencies have English speakers”.
Beijing is willing to develop people over the extended period and sometimes even the intelligence services have found it difficult to distinguish between legitimate relationships and spying. “China has a low threshold for which details is considered to be useful,” the minister responsible Dan Jarvis told parliamentarians on Wednesday, but a sudden turn in the political cycle may mean an individual rapidly marginal turning significant.
Another way to think about the relentless efforts at covert information gathering is in the wider context of the geopolitical contest between Beijing and the west at a threshold below the point of outright war. China has stepped up its hacking efforts, with the one campaign penetration of phone and data networks in 80 countries, and the another operation breach of countless connected equipment.
Beijing is engaged in persistent attempts to find covert sources on British democracy online because it seeks to be provocative, to demonstrate influence and because it has the capability.
